Inertial Action of Law in the Context of a Legal Act and a Secondary Obligation

This article draws the attention of lawyers to a previously unspecified phenomenon, as the author calls it, of the inertial operation of law, which should be considered in the context of such types of it as direct, passive and reflective, which was described in the surveys by R. Iering and Yu.S. Gambarov in relation to subjective rights. For the most part, the literature on the theory of law, both in the pre-revolutionary period and published in the Soviet and modern times, in relation to the operation of law, considers it only through the prism of a triune process: the operation of law in space, in time and in a circle of persons, leaving aside the mentioned aspect. Only in separate surveys, for example, V. I. Chervonyuk (Goyman), the self-movement of law is considered, which is similar to the problem raised in this article. Using the example of the practice of modern Russian legal regulation, the author cites cases of direct, passive and reflective action of law for clarity of understanding, but goes further than his predecessors and proposes to shift the focus in considering the process of the action of law exclusively from its subjective form to objective law as a whole. At the same time, the author substantiates a new type of it such as inertial action. Along the way, the influence of the inertial effect of the right on education in the structure of the existing legal relationship of legal obligations of a special kind, which, according to the mechanism of their occurrence, are similar to secondary rights, is analyzed, and in accordance with the principle of dichotomy, a hypothesis about the existence of secondary obligations is defined.